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STATE OF NEW YORK - BOARD OF PAROLE · 
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEAL DECISION NOTICE 





~----· Board Member(s) 
who participated: · 
Papers considered: 
Appeal 
. Control No.: 
Alyson Clark Esq. 
Washington County Public Defender 
383 Broadway 
Fort Edward, New York 12828 
02-077-19 B 
January 2019 d~cision, denying discretionary release and imposing a hold of 24 
months. 
Appellant's Briefreceived September 23; 2019 
Appeals.Unit Reviey..-: Statement of the Appeals Unit's Findings and Recommendation 
Records relied upon: Pre-Sentence Investigation Report, Parole Board Report, Interview Transcript, Parole 
·Board Release Decision Notice (Form 9026), COMP AS instrument, Offender Case 
Plan. 
Tzersigned determine that the decision appealed is hereby: 
_Affirmed _· _Vacated, remanded for de novo interview _ . Modified to ___ _ 
_ V~cated , remanded for de novo interview _ Modified to ___ _ 
~fi~med _Vacated, remanded for de noyo interview _Modified to ___ _ 
. . 
If the Final Determination is at variance with Findings and Recommendation of Appeals Unit, written 
re~sons~for the Parole Board's determination must be annexed hereto . . 
This Final Determination, the related Statement of the Appeals Unit's Finqings and the separate findin s of 
. the Parole Board, if any, were mailed to the Inmate and the Inmate's Counsel, if any, on ~.;2::c..:I 3~· !?:<~"1.· r!..__~fd..-
Distribution: Appeals Unit - Appellant -.Appellant's CoW1sel - Inst: Parole File - Central File 
P-2002(B) (11/2018) 
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   Appellant challenges the January 2019 determination of the Board, denying release and imposing 
a 24-month hold. Appellant’s instant offense involved him beating an 11 year old girl about her 
face and neck, pulled down her pants and underwear, dragged her to a pond and put a 30 pound 
log over her neck, which resulted in her death. Appellant raises the following issues: 1) the decision 
is arbitrary and capricious, and irrational bordering on impropriety, in that the Board failed to 
consider and/or properly weigh the required statutory factors. 2) the Board violated his due process 
liberty interest in a legitimate expectation of early release. 3) the Board violated his right to 
counsel, right to challenge evidence, etc. at his hearing. 4) the decision was predetermined. 5) the 
Board violated his 8th amendment right to have the Board look at youth and its attendant 
circumstances, as appellant was only 15 years old when he committed this murder. 6) no 
aggravating factors exist. 7) the Board illegally resentenced him. 8) the decision lacks details. 9) 
the decision is virtually identical to prior Board decisions. 10) the Board showed bias. 11) the 
Board failed to comply with the 2011 amendments to the Executive Law in that the statutes are 
now rehabilitation and future/forward focused. 12) the decision is based upon erroneous 
information as he didn’t refuse to take sex offender programming. 13) the 24 month hold is 
excessive. 
 
   Discretionary release to parole is not to be granted “merely as a reward for good conduct or efficient 
performance of duties while confined but after considering if there is a reasonable probability that, if 
such inmate is released, he will live and remain at liberty without violating the law, and that his 
release is not incompatible with the welfare of society and will not so deprecate the seriousness of 
his crime as to undermine respect for the law.”  Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) (emphasis added); 
accord Matter of Hamilton v. New York State Div. of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1268, 990 N.Y.S.2d 714 
(3d Dept. 2014).  Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) requires the Board to consider criteria which is 
relevant to the specific inmate, including, but not limited to, the inmate’s institutional record and 
criminal behavior.  People ex rel. Herbert v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 
N.Y.S.2d 881 (1st Dept. 1983). While consideration of these factors is mandatory, “the ultimate 
decision to parole a prisoner is discretionary.”  Matter of Silmon v. Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 477, 
718 N.Y.S.2d 704, 708 (2000).  Thus, it is well settled that the weight to be accorded the requisite 
factors is solely within the Board’s discretion.  See, e.g., Matter of Delacruz v. Annucci, 122 A.D.3d 
1413, 997 N.Y.S.2d 872 (4th Dept. 2014); Matter of Hamilton, 119 A.D.3d at 1271, 990 N.Y.S.2d 
at 717; Matter of Garcia v. New York State Div. of Parole, 239 A.D.2d 235, 239, 657 N.Y.S.2d 
415, 418 (1st Dept. 1997).  The Board need not explicitly refer to each factor in its decision, nor give 
them equal weight.  Matter of Betancourt v. Stanford, 148 A.D.3d 1497, 49 N.Y.S.3d 315 (3d Dept. 
2017); Matter of LeGeros v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 139 A.D.3d 1068, 30 N.Y.S.3d 834 
(2d Dept. 2016); Matter of Phillips v. Dennison, 41 A.D.3d 17, 21, 834 N.Y.S.2d 121, 124 (1st 
Dept. 2007). 
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   Although the Board placed emphasis on the crime, the record reflects it also considered other 
appropriate factors and it was not required to place equal weight on each factor considered.  Matter 
of Peralta v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 157 A.D.3d 1151, 69 N.Y.S.3d 885 (3d Dept. 2018). 
Although the Board placed emphasis on the crime, it was free to do so given all factors need not 
be given equal weight.  Matter of Arena v. New York State Dep’t of Corr. & Cmty. Supervision, 
156 A.D.3d 1101, 65 N.Y.S.3d 471 (3d Dept. 2017); Matter of Gordon v. Stanford, 148 A.D.3d 
1502, 50 N.Y.S.3d 627 (3d Dept. 2017);  Matter of Mullins v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 136 
A.D.3d 1141, 25 N.Y.S.3d 698 (3d Dept. 2016). 
 
   The fact that the Board afforded greater weight to the inmate’s criminal history, as opposed to 
other positive factors, does not render the denial of parole for that reason irrational or improper.  
Matter of Davis v. Evans, 105 A.D.3d 1305, 963 N.Y.S.2d 485 (3d Dept. 2013); Matter of Lashway 
v. Evans, 110 A.D.3d 1417, 1418, 974 N.Y.S.2d 164, 165 (3d Dept. 2013); Matter of McKee v. New 
York State Bd. of Parole, 157 A.D.2d 944, 550 N.Y.S.2d 204 (3d Dept. 1990).   
     Appellant signed a Program Refusal Notification Form on August 10, 2018 refusing to take sex 
offender programming. The Board may consider an inmate’s need to complete rehabilitative 
programming in denying parole.  See Matter of Allen v. Stanford, 161 A.D.3d 1503, 1506, 78 
N.Y.S.3d 445 (3d Dept.), lv. denied, 32 N.Y.3d 903 (2018); Matter of Barrett v. New York State 
Div. of Parole, 242 A.D.2d 763, 661 N.Y.S.2d 857 (3d Dept. 1997); see also Matter of Connelly v. 
New York State Div. of Parole, 286 A.D.2d 792, 729 N.Y.S.2d 808, 809 (3d Dept.), appeal 
dismissed 97 N.Y.2d 677, 738 N.Y.S.2d 291 (2001). 
   The Board may consider a district attorney’s recommendation to deny parole.  Matter of 
Applegate v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 164 A.D.3d 996, 997, 82 N.Y.S.3d 240 (3d Dept. 2018); 
Matter of Porter v. Alexander, 63 A.D.3d 945, 881 N.Y.S.2d 157 (2d Dept. 2009); Matter of Walker 
v. Travis, 252 A.D.2d 360, 676 N.Y.S.2d 52 (1st Dept. 1998); Matter of Walker v. New York State 
Bd. of Parole, 218 A.D.2d 891, 630 N.Y.S.2d 417 (3d Dept. 1995); Matter of Williams v. New York 
State Bd. of Parole, 220 A.D.2d 753, 633 N.Y.S.2d 182 (2d Dept. 1995); Matter of Confoy v. New 
York State Div. of Parole, 173 A.D.2d 1014, 569 N.Y.S.2d 846, 847 (3d Dept. 1991); Matter of Lynch 
v. New York State Div. of Parole, 82 A.D.2d 1012, 442 N.Y.S.2d 179 (3d Dept. 1981).  
   The Board’s decision satisfied the criteria set out in Executive Law § 259-i(2)(a), as it was 
sufficiently detailed to inform the inmate of the reasons for the denial of parole.  Matter of Applegate 
v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 164 A.D.3d 996, 997, 82 N.Y.S.3d 240 (3d Dept. 2018); Matter of 
Kozlowski v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 108 A.D.3d 435, 968 N.Y.S.2d 87 (1st Dept. 2013); 
Matter of Little v. Travis, 15 A.D.3d 698, 788 N.Y.S.2d 628 (3d Dept. 2005); Matter of Davis v. 
Travis, 292 A.D.2d 742, 739 N.Y.S.2d 300 (3d Dept. 2002); People ex rel. Herbert v. New York 
State Bd. of Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881 (1st Dept. 1983).   
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    Appellant’s assertion that the denial of parole release amounted to an improper resentencing is 
without merit inasmuch as the Board fulfilled its obligation to determine the propriety of release 
per Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) and after considering the factors set forth therein.  Executive 
Law § 259 et seq.; Penal Law § 70.40; Matter of Murray v. Evans, 83 A.D.3d 1320, 920 N.Y.S.2d 
745 (3d Dept. 2011); Matter of Crews v. New York State Exec. Dept. Bd. of Parole Appeals Unit, 
281 A.D.2d 672, 720 N.Y.S.2d 855 (3d Dept. 2001).  The Board was vested with discretion to 
determine whether release was appropriate notwithstanding the minimum period of incarceration 
set by the Court.  Matter of Burress v. Dennison, 37 A.D.3d 930, 829 N.Y.S.2d 283 (3d Dept. 
2007); Matter of Cody v. Dennison, 33 A.D.3d 1141, 1142, 822 N.Y.S.2d 677 (3d Dept. 2006), lv. 
denied, 8 N.Y.3d 802, 830 N.Y.S.2d 698 (2007).  The appellant has not in any manner been 
resentenced.  Matter of Mullins v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 136 A.D.3d 1141, 1142, 25 
N.Y.S.3d 698 (3d Dept. 2016). 
   An inmate has no Constitutional right to be conditionally released on parole before expiration of 
a valid sentence.  Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal & Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 
99 S. Ct. 2100, 2104 (1979); Matter of Russo v. Bd. of Parole, 50 N.Y.2d 69, 427 N.Y.S.2d 982 
(1980); Matter of Vineski v. Travis, 244 A.D.2d 737, 664 N.Y.S.2d 391 (3d Dept. 1997).  The 
New York State parole scheme “holds out no more than a possibility of parole” and thus does not 
create a protected liberty interest implicating the due process clause.  Matter of Russo, 50 N.Y.2d 
at 75-76, 427 N.Y.S.2d at 985; see also Barna v. Travis, 239 F.3d 169, 171 (2d Cir. 2001); Matter 
of Freeman v. New York State Div. of Parole, 21 A.D.3d 1174, 800 N.Y.S.2d 797 (3d Dept. 2005). 
   Nothing in the due process clause requires the Parole Board to specify the particular evidence on 
which rests the discretionary determination an inmate is not ready for conditional release. 
Duemmel v Fischer, 368 Fed.Appx. 180, 182 (2d Cir. 2010). There is no due process requirement 
that the Parole Board disclose its release criteria.  Haymes v Regan, 525 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1975).    
The due process clause is not violated by the Board’s balancing of the statutory criteria, and which 
is not to be second guessed by the courts. Mathie v Dennison, 2007 WL 2351072 (S.D.N.Y. 2007); 
MacKenzie v Cunningham, 2014 WL 5089395 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). 
    Parole is not constitutionally based, but is a creature of statute which may be imposed subject to 
conditions imposed by the state legislature. Banks v Stanford, 159 A.D.3d 134, 71 N.Y.S.3d 515 
(2d Dept. 2018). Parole release is a statutory grant of a restricted form of liberty prior to the 
expiration of a sentence. Johnson v Superintendent Adirondack Correctional Facility, 174 A.D.3d 
992, 106 N.Y.S.3d 408 (3d Dept. 2019). 
    Pursuant to Executive Law §259-i(2)(a), the inmate had a Parole Board Release Interview, and 
not a hearing. The interview is not an adversarial proceeding and there is no right to have an attorney 
present on behalf of the inmate.  Matter of Russo v. New York State Board of Parole, 50 N.Y.2d 76, 
427 N.Y.S.2d 982 (1980); Matter of Briguglio v. New York State Board of Parole, 24 N.Y.2d 21, 
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298 N.Y.S.2d 704 (1969); Menechino v. Oswald, 430 F.2d 403 (2d Cir. 1970); McCall v Pataki, 
232 F.3d 321, 323 (2d Cir. 2000); Billiteri v. United States Bd. of Parole, 541 F.2d 938, 944-945 
(2d Cir. 1976). 
   There is a presumption of honesty and integrity that attaches to Judges and administrative fact-
finders.  See People ex rel. Carlo v. Bednosky, 294 A.D.2d 382, 383, 741 N.Y.S.2d 703 (2d Dept. 
2002); People ex. rel. Johnson v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 180 A.D.2d 914, 916, 580 N.Y.S.2d 
957, 959 (3d Dept. 1992).  The Board is presumed to follow its statutory commands and internal 
policies in fulfilling its obligations.  See Garner v. Jones, 529 U.S. 244, 256, 120 S. Ct. 1362, 1371 
(2000). There is no evidence the Board’s decision was predetermined based upon the instant offense.  
Matter of Gonzalvo v. Stanford, 153 A.D.3d 1021, 56 N.Y.S.3d 896 (3d Dept. 2017); Matter of 
Hakim-Zaki v. New York State Div. of Parole, 29 A.D.3d 1190, 814 N.Y.S.2d 414 (3d Dept. 2006); 
Matter of Guerin v. New York State Div. of Parole, 276 A.D.2d 899, 695 N.Y.S.2d 622 (3d Dept. 
2000). Nor was any penal philosophy discussed. Appellant has failed to overcome the presumption 
that the Board complied with its duty.  See Matter of Davis v. New York State Div. of Parole, 114 
A.D.2d 412, 494 N.Y.S.2d 136 (2d Dept. 1985). 
 
   As for an alleged similarity to prior Board decisions, since the Board is required to consider the 
same statutory factors each time an inmate appears before it, it follows that the same aspects of the 
individual’s record may again constitute the primary grounds for a denial of parole.  Matter of 
Hakim v. Travis, 302 A.D.2d 821, 754 N.Y.S.2d 600 (3d Dept. 2003); Matter of Bridget v. Travis, 
300 A.D.2d 776, 750 N.Y.S.2d 795 (3d Dept. 2002).  The Board is required to consider the same 
factors each time he appears in front of them.  Matter of Williams v. New York State Div. of Parole, 
70 A.D.3d 1106, 894 N.Y.S.2d 224 (3d Dept.), lv. denied, 14 N.Y.3d 709, 901 N.Y.S.2d 143 (2010). 
 
   There must be support in the record to prove an alleged bias and proof that the decision flowed 
from such bias.  Matter of Hernandez v. McSherry, 271 A.D.2d 777, 706 N.Y.S.2d 647 (3d Dept. 
2000), lv. denied, 95 N.Y.2d 769, 722 N.Y.S.2d 472 (2000); see also Matter of Gonzalvo v. 
Stanford, 153 A.D.3d 1021, 56 N.Y.S.3d 896 (3d Dept. 2017) (rejecting bias claim); Matter of 
Grune v. Board of Parole,41 A.D.3d 1014, 838 N.Y.S.2d 694 (3d Dept. 2007). No such proof 
exists in this case. 
 
   The Board may place greater weight on the nature of the crime without the existence of any 
aggravating factors.  Matter of Hamilton v. New York State Div. of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1268, 990 
N.Y.S.2d 714 (3d Dept. 2014). 
   The Board during the interview spent a considerable amount of time on all aspects of appellant’s 
youth and its attendant circumstances, even though appellant denies committing the crime. The 
Board also spent time during the interview inquiring as to how the therapeutic classes taken by 
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appellant have impacted him. Thus, youth and its transient immaturity/attendant circumstances 
factors were taken into consideration by the Board. 
 
     Denial of parole is neither arbitrary nor capricious when the Parole Board relied on the factors 
defined by the New York statute. Hodge v Griffin, 2014 WL 2453333(S.D.N.Y. 2014) citing 
Romer v Travis, 2003 WL 21744079. An arbitrary action is one without sound basis in reason and 
without regard to the facts. Rationality is what is reviewed under an arbitrary and capricious 
standard. Hamilton v New York State Division of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1268, 990 N.Y.S.2d 714 (3d 
Dept. 2014). An action is arbitrary and capricious when it is taken without sound basis in reason 
or regard to the facts. Ward v City of Long Beach, 20 N.Y.3d 1042 (2013). Denial is neither 
arbitrary nor capricious when the Board relies on factors defined by New York statute.  Siao-Paul 
v. Connolly, 564 F. Supp. 2d 232, 242 (S.D.N.Y. 2008); Hanna v New York State Board of Parole, 
169 A.D.3d 503, 92 N.Y.S.3d 621 (1st Dept. 2019). 
   The appellant has failed to demonstrate that the Parole Board’s determination was affected by a 
showing of irrationality bordering on impropriety. Matter of Silmon v Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 718 
N.Y.S.2d 704 (2001); Matter of Russo v New York State Board of Parole, 50 N.Y.2d 69, 77, 427 
N.Y.S.2d 982 (1980). 
   In the absence of a convincing demonstration that the Board did not consider the statutory 
factors, it must be presumed that the Board fulfilled its duty.  Matter of Fuchino v. Herbert, 255 
A.D.2d 914, 914, 680 N.Y.S.2d 389, 390 (4th Dept. 1998); Matter of McLain v. New York State 
Div. of Parole, 204 A.D.2d 456, 611 N.Y.S.2d 629 (2d Dept. 1994); Matter of McKee v. New York 
State Bd. of Parole, 157 A.D.2d 944, 945, 550 N.Y.S.2d 204, 205 (3d Dept. 1990); People ex rel. 
Herbert, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881. 
   Appellant’s claim that the Board failed to comply with the 2011 amendments to the Executive Law 
is rejected. Dolan v New York State Board of Parole, 122 A.D.3d 1058, 995 N.Y.S.2d 850 (3d Dept. 
2014); Tran v Evans, 126 A.D.3d 1196, 3 N.Y.S.3d 633 (3d Dept. 2015); Boccadisi v Stanford, 133 
A.D.3d 1169, 20 N.Y.S.3d 477 (3d Dept. 2015).  
   The 2011 amendments to the Executive Law, as well as the state regulations governing parole, do 
not create a legitimate expectancy of release that would give rise to a due process interest in parole. 
Fuller v Evans, 586 Fed.Appx. 825 (2d Cir. 2014) cert.den. 135 S.Ct. 2807, 192 L.Ed2d 851. 
    Contrary to Appellant’s claim, the 2011 amendments and 9 NYCRR § 8002.2(a) as amended 
do not represent a rehabilitation/forward-looking shift requiring the COMPAS to be the 
fundamental basis for release decisions. This proposition is not supported by the language of the 
statute itself, considering the relatively modest change to Section 259-c(4) and the absence of any 
substantive change to Section 259-i(2), which governs the discretionary release consideration 
process.  In 2011, the Executive Law was amended to require procedures incorporating risk and 
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needs principles to “assist” the Board in making parole release decisions.  Executive Law § 259–
c(4).  The Board satisfies this requirement in part by using the COMPAS instrument.  Matter of 
Montane v. Evans, 116 A.D.3d 197, 202, 981 N.Y.S.2d 866, 870 (3d Dept. 2014); see also Matter 
of Hawthorne v. Stanford, 135 A.D.3d 1036, 1042, 22 N.Y.S.3d 640, 645 (3d Dept. 2016); Matter 
of LeGeros, 139 A.D.3d 1068, 30 N.Y.S.3d 834; Matter of Robles v. Fischer, 117 A.D.3d 1558, 
1559, 985 N.Y.S.2d 386, 387 (4th Dept. 2014).  However, the COMPAS is not predictive and was 
never intended to be the sole indicator of risk and needs as the Board gets risk and needs 
information from a variety of sources, including the statutory factors and the interview.  Notably, 
the 2011 amendments did not eliminate the requirement that the Board conduct a case-by-case 
review of each inmate by considering the statutory factors, including the instant offense.  Executive 
Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A); Matter of Montane, 116 A.D.3d at 202, 981 N.Y.S.2d at 870.  The 
amendments also did not change the three substantive standards that the Board is required to apply 
when deciding whether to grant parole.  Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A).  Thus, the COMPAS 
instrument cannot mandate a particular result.  Matter of King, 137 A.D.3d 1396, 26 N.Y.S.3d 815.  
Rather, the COMPAS is an additional consideration that the Board must weigh along with the 
statutory factors for the purposes of deciding whether all three statutory standards are satisfied.  
See Matter of Rivera v. N.Y. State Div. of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1107, 1108, 990 N.Y.S.2d 295 (3d 
Dept. 2014); accord Matter of Dawes v. Annucci, 122 A.D.3d 1059, 994 N.Y.S.2d 747 (3d Dept. 
2014); see also Matter of Gonzalvo v. Stanford, 153 A.D.3d 1021, 56 N.Y.S.3d 896 (3d Dept. 
2017). 
 
   The Board is not required to give the COMPAS and case plan greater weight than the other statutory 
factors.  Matter of Gonzalvo v. Stanford, 153 A.D.3d 1021, 56 N.Y.S.3d 896 (3d Dept. 2017); 
accord Matter of Lewis v. Stanford, 153 A.D.3d 1478, 59 N.Y.S.3d 726 (3d Dept. 2017). The 
Board still is entitled to place greater emphasis on the instant offense.  See Matter of Montane v. 
Evans, 116 A.D.3d 197, 203, 981 N.Y.S.2d 866, 871 (3d Dept. 2014); see also Matter of Gonzalvo 
v. Stanford, 153 A.D.3d 1021, 56 N.Y.S.3d 896 (3d Dept. 2017); Matter of Lewis v. Stanford, 153 
A.D.3d 1478, 59 N.Y.S.3d 726 (3d Dept. 2017).  
   The Board’s decision to hold an inmate for the maximum period of 24 months is within the 
Board’s discretion and within its authority pursuant to Executive Law § 259-i(2)(a) and 9 
N.Y.C.R.R. § 8002.3(b).  Matter of Tatta v. State of N.Y., Div. of Parole, 290 A.D.2d 907, 737 
N.Y.S.2d 163 (3d Dept. 2002), lv. denied, 98 N.Y.2d 604, 746 N.Y.S.2d 278 (2002); see also 
Matter of Campbell v. Evans, 106 A.D.3d 1363, 965 N.Y.S.2d 672 (3d Dept. 2013).  In the absence 
of impropriety, the reconsideration date set by the Board will not be disturbed.   Matter of Tatta v. 
State of N.Y., Div. of Parole, 290 A.D.2d 907, 908, 737 N.Y.S.2d 163 (3d Dept. 2002); accord 
Matter of Evans v. Dennison, 13 Misc. 3d 1236(A), 831 N.Y.S.2d 353 (Sup. Ct. Westchester Co. 
2006) (rejecting challenge to 24-month hold). 
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Recommendation:  Affirm. 
